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Saturday, November 14, 2026

Sesame Seed Market Report: November 2026


The Five-Month Lull

Hello everyone, once again.

It's been six weeks since the last report, and I've spent most of that time turning one question over. Most of what we talked about in September has now played out. India is short, Brazil is short, and Pakistan has settled at its real size. The market has already taken all of it in, so there's no point in saying it all again. The only question worth writing about now is the one I keep asking in every conversation: what moves this market from here?

As always, these are just my readings, from the field and from friends across the trade. Where the trade is divided, I'll say so. Let's discuss.

India: Caught on the Wrong Foot

In July I said we'd get 150,000–160,000 tonnes at the very best, even with a return to normal yields. The crop has come in around 110,000. For India that is practically nothing. It barely covers what we consume ourselves.

What makes it worse is when we were caught. Until a few months ago this market was bearish, and nobody was buying. We didn't import much when imports were easy, and now the shelf is bare and the door is narrow.

India really has just two places to buy from, Brazil and Nigeria. Brazil doesn't have enough. Its shipments to us over the last three months average barely 10–11k a month, and Brazil's own October export figures show about 11,600 tonnes sailing for India, so that number is holding. Nigeria, realistically, sent us less than 3k in both September and October. So until January we can expect about 14–15k a month, and that doesn't create any panic.

That is the part that bothers me, because January is where it changes. From January to May we have no crop at all, so every tonne is an import, and our summer crop only starts landing from May. The bare minimum to keep our hulled exports running is about 15k a month, which is something like 75,000 tonnes over the five months. Last year Brazil carried most of that. From the customs entries I could see, it was landing 13–21k a month in January to March alone.

Now look at what India actually managed this spring. In April and May, with the summer crop on its way, we took only about 16,000 tonnes from the whole world, about 8k a month. And the mix had already turned. Brazil fell from about 14,600 tonnes in those two months a year earlier to about 8,600, and Nigeria rose from a few hundred tonnes to about 4,900. This year Brazil's crop is half the size and its sheds are empty, and Nigeria has never sent us more than a fraction of what we will need. 75,000 tonnes in five months is nearly double the pace India managed this spring, from origins that don't have the seed to give.

Pakistan: The Number Settles

Pakistan is now confirmed from several sources at around 250k at the very most. About 150k has already shipped. Another 10–15k will move across the border, and that trade will carry on until January. In usage terms, adding what their own hullers have already taken, around 200–220k is gone. What's left, perhaps 30–50k, has to feed a hulling industry that runs all year, for another seven or eight months. If you divide it out that is 4–7k a month, which is very little.

It's worth looking at when Pakistan's seed reaches China, because that is where this gets interesting. In a normal year Pakistani cargo lands in China in the autumn and early winter, and then it fades. Look at the last season. In November and December 2024 China took about 107,000 tonnes from Pakistan in just those two months. By the time we reached February to May 2025 it was down to 8k, 7k, 8k and 3k a month, and the whole five months from January to May came to only about 42,000. Pakistan had done its job and gone home.

This spring was different. From January to August this year China took about 113,000 tonnes from Pakistan, against about 50,000 in the same eight months of last year. Pakistani seed was still landing in China in the months when it normally isn't there at all. And that is the same stretch in which Niger and Togo were each running about a fifth below the year before. I can't tell you exactly how much old-crop seed was still sitting in Pakistan at the time, but the pattern tells me the leftover from the earlier crop helped fill the hole that West Africa left in the spring.

That is the part that won't repeat. This crop is 250k at the very most, around 150k has already shipped, and the usage figure I gave you leaves 30–50k for the hulling units to run on for the next seven or eight months. There is no leftover this time, so next spring Pakistan has nothing spare to send to China, and the hole that Pakistan helped fill this year has to be filled by someone else.

Nigeria: Everyone at One Door

Nigeria is the origin everyone will lean on from here. The new crop has been arriving since late September, and the Lome to Kano areas have only just started. The trade puts about 100,000 to 120,000 tonnes already harvested, with a similar quantity to follow until January. And look at who is waiting at the door:

  • Nigeria now has several hulling units that need raw material to cover a long stretch.
  • It has Japan to cater to, and that needs stocking and preparing for. Japan took close to 70,000 tonnes from Nigeria and Niger together last year.
  • Türkiye has been buying into Ramadan, and it takes around 190,000 tonnes a year in total.
  • And from January, India has only Nigeria to look at.

One more thing I'm hearing from the trade is that the La Niña effect is showing up and yields are coming in lower than hoped. Sesame can get by on less rain, but less rain together with heat always costs some growth and yield, whatever the crop. So I'd be careful with the top end of the crop estimates.

Then there is China, which is the biggest door of all. China's customs show a very large share of its seed coming from Niger. Last year the whole of it came to about 456,000 tonnes, which is close to a third of everything China imported. That is the single biggest source in the world.

This year it has been smaller. From January to August China took about 305,000 tonnes from Niger, against about 389,000 in the same eight months of last year, roughly a fifth less. But I don't read that as a weak West African crop or a China that stopped buying. In the same months Pakistan sent about 60,000 tonnes more than the year before, Brazil about 45,000 more, and Ethiopia about 25,000 more. Put those together and they cover the whole of the Niger shortfall, with room to spare. China had plenty of seed to choose from this spring, and it took what was nearest and ready first. West Africa simply wasn't needed as much.

Now look at what is happening this season. Even with that much harvested, the Nigerian shipments I see going to China are small. That does not worry me yet. What lands in China in October sailed in August and September, at the tail end of the old crop. The new seed has to be dried, cleaned and loaded first, and the sailing time changes a lot from one line to another, from about 25 days to well over a month. So I expect it to start landing in China from late November, with the bulk in December and January. What I would like to know is how much of it is sitting with exporters, and how much has already gone to Türkiye and Japan, who buy ahead of Ramadan. Nobody I have spoken to can give me that number. China, meanwhile, enters the season having leaned on Pakistan and Brazil more than usual, and those two have little left to give. So the cargo it needs will come from the same places as everyone else's, Japan, Türkiye, India and our own hullers included.

China: How the Pile Was Built

To understand where China stands, I went back through two years of its customs records, because the pile didn't appear by accident.

In 2024 China imported about 1.18 million tonnes. The shape of that year is the shape of every year. From September to December about 450,000 tonnes came from the autumn origins, Pakistan, Tanzania, Mozambique and Myanmar. Then from January to May West Africa took over, about 370,000 tonnes of a 555,000 total, with Sudan and Ethiopia adding another 140,000.

In 2025 it grew to a record 1.46 million, about 280,000 more, and when I look at who grew, it is two origins. Niger went from about 316,000 to 456,000, and Brazil, which sent nothing in 2024, came in with about 160,000. Against that, Pakistan halved to about 90,000 and Sudan collapsed from 90,000 to under 30,000. The shape was the same again. The autumn months brought about 530,000, and January to May belonged to West Africa, about 450,000 of a 630,000 total, with Sudan and Ethiopia down to about 80,000.

This year, January to August, China has imported about as much as last year, a little over 900,000 tonnes, but the mix changed. Niger was a fifth lower, and Pakistan, Ethiopia and Brazil stepped in.

The pile itself tells the same story. The standard warehouses at Qingdao grew from about 215,000 tonnes in February to about 335,000 now, a build of roughly 120,000. Pakistan added about 35,000 of that, Nigeria about 33,000, Ethiopia and Tanzania about 20,000 each, and Togo and Mali about 20,000. Brazil, for all the noise, is flat at about 30,000, because what it sent moved straight through.

China: What Is on the Water

China is sitting comfortably on that stock, about 415,000 tonnes in my own weekly sheet, of which around 335,000 is in the standard warehouses. October brought about 143,000 tonnes, the autumn cargo landing: Tanzania about 44,000, Brazil 25,000, Pakistan 24,000, Niger 14,000, Mozambique 12,000. That is seed that sailed in August and September, and it tells me nothing about the winter.

What I keep staring at is what sailed in October. Pakistan about 12k, Brazil about 4k and Nigeria about 3k. Tanzania and Mozambique are not significant, 10–15k at best between them. Add a little from here and there, and I can't make October come to more than 50k. Brazil's own export figures say the same thing. Only about 5,600 tonnes left Brazil for China in October, against about 11,600 for India, about 3,400 for Türkiye and about 2,800 for Egypt. What Brazil still has is going to buyers closer to hand.

That 50k is what lands in November and December. Last winter those two months brought about 100,000 tonnes each. I'm expecting about half that. China will of course book more, and nobody knows exactly what it consumes in a month. It is well over 100k, and more in December and January, its peak. But once the autumn cargo is through, the port starts to give back stock.

Look inside the pile as well. In the standard warehouses on 19 October, West African seed was already about 130,000 tonnes: Nigeria close to 90,000, Togo and Mali about 38,000, Chad a few thousand. That is close to 40% of the stock. Pakistan and Brazil together hold about 75,000, and neither will refill that before their next crops. Sudan holds about 2,000.

So where does it stop?

  • Around 250k, nothing changes. China buys slow and steady from Chad, Burkina, Togo, Mali and the rest, and plays on its average.
  • Below 200k, some sort of panic sets in. They cover aggressively, the markets they buy from start moving up, and everyone else follows.
  • And if they don't cover? They simply stop eating, or let the stock run down to zero. I don't know which. I wish I did.

China has shown before that it can sit and wait, so none of this is a forecast of panic. It says where to look.

After January: Who Fills the Gap?

Put the two years together and the window for next spring is plain. In a normal year China takes 550,000 to 650,000 tonnes between January and May, and somewhere between two-thirds and three-quarters of it is West African. Sudan and Ethiopia add 80,000 to 140,000, and a little trickles in from the autumn origins. That is the whole window.

Now take away what is gone.

  • Pakistan has nothing spare, as I said above.
  • Brazil has a short crop. According to trade whispers it barely has 10–15k of unsold seed, and that with a higher FFA. If we swept the entire Brazilian warehouse, 30k unsold would be the very best case.
  • Tanzania and Mozambique are autumn origins anyway, and their crops are smaller this time.
  • Sudan has a smaller crop and will keep a good part of it at home, as below.
  • Ethiopia is no bigger than last year.

What is left is West Africa, Chad, Burkina, Togo, Mali, Senegal and Nigeria, and they have to deliver about what they delivered last spring, 450,000 tonnes or more, with nobody helping. This spring Pakistan, Brazil and Ethiopia together gave China something like 130,000 tonnes more than the year before. That cushion is gone. About 130,000 tonnes of West African seed is already sitting in the Qingdao port, so something over 300,000 still has to be bought, loaded and shipped between now and the spring. Nigeria's whole crop is about 200,000 to 240,000, with Japan, Türkiye, India and its own hullers at the same door.

Sudan and Ethiopia sit in a bracket of their own, and they deserve a separate look, because between them they have always been a big part of China's natural supply.

  • Sudan. China took about 90,000 tonnes from Sudan in 2024, and last year only about 27,000. Sudan still shipped about 300,000 tonnes in each of the last two years, with more of it going to Egypt, Türkiye and the Gulf. This year is different. The trade puts the crop at 320,000 to 390,000 tonnes against about 485,000 last year, with sowing down and the Gedaref rains late and thin. And Sudan is not only an exporter. It eats something like 200,000 tonnes of its own seed in a year, and that doesn't go away when the crop is short. Take it off and what is left to export is somewhere around 150,000 tonnes, about half of what it shipped. What it has sent so far this year, about 113,000 tonnes in the first half, was helped by leftover seed from the bigger crop, and that cushion is gone. So I don't expect Sudan to be a major supplier this season. Its seed will either stay home or go to Egypt.
  • Egypt. Egypt uses about 100,000 tonnes a year, three-quarters of it for tahini and halva, and it has bought most of that from Sudan, 86% of its imports in 2022. Its factories are used to Sudanese seed. With Sudan short, Egypt has already started on Brazil, about 2,800 tonnes in October, but Brazil is short too. My guess is that its next stop is Chad, and then Egypt is bidding with China, Israel and Türkiye for the same cargo. That is one more buyer at the West and Central African door, in the months when nothing else arrives.
  • Ethiopia. Ethiopia is the one everybody hopes will fill the hole. China took only about 30,000 tonnes from them in 2023, then about 90,000 in each of the last two years. This year, January to August, it is already about 110,000 against 83,000. But look at the size of the crop. The trade puts it at 200,000 to 220,000 tonnes, and that matches what actually ships, about 137,000 tonnes in the nine months to March. So the year ends around 180,000 to 200,000, no more than last year. The timing matters too. Ethiopian seed moves mostly from December to March, and September and October are thin, so it cannot help before December.

Put Sudan and Ethiopia together and China got about 120,000 tonnes from them last year, down from about 180,000 the year before. Next spring it is Chad, with a crop of no more than 120,000 tonnes, that has to cover whatever those two don't send, and Egypt is now looking at the same seed.

Who Needs What

Japan and Korea will be back. Japan bought about 190,000 tonnes in each of the last two years (193,000 in 2024, 186,000 in 2025), and this year is running only a little below that. Korea looks smaller than it is. Its seed imports for the first nine months of this year were down about a fifth, to about 50,000 tonnes. But that is only the seed. Whole seed pays a very heavy duty to enter Korea, and for years a large part of what its oil makers need has come in as roasted sesame powder from Vietnam and Myanmar, duty free. The Korean figures I can find put that anywhere from 40,000 to 70,000 tonnes a year. Add it up and Korea uses something near 150,000 tonnes, and part of that reaches us as Vietnam's buying of seed. Vietnam's imports jumped by about 16,000 tonnes last year to about 60,000. Some of that is crushed at home for oil, but I suspect a good part is ground and roasted for Korea. So Japan and Korea together are comfortably over 300,000 tonnes. Korea's government tender has already been cut from about 56,000 tonnes to 46,000 this year, and India, which supplied about 26,000 of last year's tender, has supplied almost nothing so far in this one. I'm curious who ends up supplying Korea this time, with Pakistan running thin.

China brought in 1.46 million tonnes last year, which is a little over 120k a month, although some of that went into the pile instead of into the factories. At worst they'll keep buying 100k a month just to keep a steady flow. World trade outside China is close to a million tonnes, and depending on how I count the peaks, the rest of the world needs somewhere between 50k and 80k a month. That is 150–200k a month of buying, into a five-month window when no major crop arrives.

The Part I Keep Turning Over

The sesame world changed when Brazil and Pakistan arrived at a time of year when the market had a lull. Now we have the reverse: a five-month lull when nothing major arrives. The whole weight shifts to Burkina, Togo, Mali, Senegal and Chad, with Sudan and Ethiopia behind them. They have to come out picture perfect. Any origin that falters, and we could have a panic.

But here is the question I still can't crack:

Will China let its port stock advantage wither away?

In July I wrote that China has quietly become the carryover holder for the whole world. That pile took three years to build. At a little over 400k and normal use, it is about three months of cover. Even a fall to 200k is still more than a month and a half, so China has no need to hurry. That is what makes it hard to read. They can wait, as they did last winter. Whatever happens in the next two years, I think it will be very hard to build again at a discount. If China lets it run down, the buffer that has kept this market in a range goes with it. The world then moves to crop-to-crop pricing, which is the benchmark speculation phase I've written about before.

What I'm Watching

  • The Qingdao weekly number against 250k and 200k, and whether the West African seed in the port is being drawn down or topped up.
  • November and December arrivals in China: does the October sailing figure of about 50k hold, or does something bigger turn up?
  • Where the Nigerian crop goes: how much reaches China in December and January, and how much goes to Türkiye and Japan or sits with exporters.
  • Brazil's sailings: whether any seed goes to China at all, and how much more goes to Egypt and Türkiye.
  • The first Sahel and West African arrivals: on time, and to specification?
  • Sudan and Egypt: how much of Sudan's crop is left after its own use, whether it goes to Egypt, and whether Egypt turns to Chad.
  • Ethiopia: whether its seed starts moving in December as it should.
  • India's monthly imports from January: whether Brazil and Nigeria between them get anywhere near 15k a month.
  • Korea's next tender, and who supplies it, and whether Vietnam's imports keep climbing.
  • Nigeria from January: hullers, Japan, Türkiye and India all at one door.

That's all from me for now. As always, these are just one man's readings. I've been wrong before and may be again, so weigh it against your own view. And if you've found an origin I've missed, tell me. Let's keep talking. 

Stay well, and good luck with your covers. 

— Mukul Gupta

Tuesday, September 29, 2026

Sesame seedmarket synopsis — 29 September 2026


Hello again everyone , 

A week ago this was a balanced market. Brazil is confirmed short, Pakistan's yields have come in below expectation, and India's crop has gone from an exportable surplus to barely enough for itself. Nothing large is left to arrive before November. The next fortnight sets the tone for the rest of the season.

Three numbers that frame the season

  • 381,500 tonnes sitting in Chinese ports.
  • Three origins still offering at or below $1,200 — Pakistan, Brazil, Nigeria. Everything else is above it.
  • November–December — Pakistan and Brazil sold out, Nigeria arriving thin.

The four grades, as this report uses them. Crushing: oil, the cheapest tier and China's largest slot. Whitish: oil, paste, tahina, roasting, sorting, direct consumption. Hulled: India and a handful of African plants, sold to Europe, US, Australia, Middle East. Black: its own market, at roughly double the rest.

Where the market agrees

1. The short crop is synchronised, not local. Tanzania 225k to about 150k, with the South and Lindi grade down 41%. Brazil roughly 500k to 220k. Mozambique 100k to 50–60k. Pakistan's yield losses now confirm a crop below 275k. Nigeria confirmed short, with the extent argued between 20% and 30%. Origins sharing no weather system contracted in the same season.

2. China holds the world's carry-over. Port stock is 381,500 tonnes. January to July imports were flat in volume at 810,563 tonnes against 811,103, but at $1,144 a tonne against $1,404 — $260 less. The Chinese forecast for the full year is 1.30–1.35 million against a record 1.46 million.

3. Every major buyer paid less last year, independently. China down 15%, Japan down 15%, Korea down 18% on unit value, across three unconnected customs authorities. Two of the three bought record volume while doing it.

4. Farmer selling is price-driven, not cash-driven. Burkina's floor price fell and farmers simply waited; arrivals shifted from the December–January peak into February. Pakistani growers cut area after poor realisation last season. Brazilian farmers moved land to competing second crops. Origin supply now arrives late and responds to price.

5. No large buyer is single-origin any more. Korea's tenders clear across half a dozen origins at once. Türkiye has rebalanced toward West Africa and Ethiopia. Japan sits at 89% African. Where a buyer once had a preferred origin, it now has an approved list.

6. Compliance is a cost, and it sits at origin. Japan has logged 57 rejections since January 2023 — aflatoxin a third of them, carbaryl and imidacloprid most of the rest — and runs mandatory inspection on most African origins. Mozambique's compulsory local test at $7–9 a tonne delayed the whole May export window. Burkina's new licensing requires 500 tonnes of declared storage. Each of these pushes volume toward the larger players.

7. Crushing demand and food demand do not share supply. China crushes most of what it buys. Korea crushes 71%. Europe is bakery and organic. Türkiye is tahini and halva. Seed bought for oil cannot be turned around and sold to a bakery buyer, which is why a surplus and a shortage can be true at the same time.

China's port stock

The number is 381,500 tonnes against roughly 266,000 a year ago. It is a record, and on any normal reading it caps the market. It does not, for two reasons. The first is what the stock is made of.

GradeOriginsTonnesShare
CrushingNigeria 116,205 · Togo/Mali 50,854 · Pakistan 40,515 · Chad 6,791214,36556.2%
WhitishTanzania 53,067 · Ethiopia 46,200 · Mozambique 16,366 · Sudan 5,417121,05031.7%
Natural whiteBrazil30,7498.1%
BlackMyanmar8,2792.2%
Others7,0581.9%
Total381,500100%

The split mirrors Chinese usage almost exactly. This is slotted inventory, not a surplus in one place. Crushing seed cannot relieve a whitish buyer, and whitish stock does nothing for a crusher.

The second reason is cost. Every bucket in that table was bought below what it would cost to replace today — narrowly on the crushing side, by a wide margin on Brazil and on the whitish origins. Nobody holding it has a reason to sell it cheap, and the only thing moving it is consumption. Crushers are drawing on older stock and blending it with expensive fresh local seed to bring FFA down to specification, which also means the crushing-grade portion cannot be held indefinitely.

Tanzania and Mozambique have shipped about 90% of their crops and have little left to offer. Chinese ports hold roughly 69,000 tonnes of the two, several times what remains at origin. Until next year's harvest, a whitish buyer outside China is bidding against Qingdao rather than against Dar es Salaam or Nacala.

What has moved

Pakistan. From a 350,000 t forecast to 270–300,000 t, and yield losses now confirm below 275k. Around 40k shipped in August and 70k in September, plus cargo held for Korean tenders and active border trade — 140–150k already done. Balance 120–150k, gross. Word of mouth from the trade.

India. Area was up 15.1% and pointed to an exportable surplus. Badly damaged by erratic rain and weather anomalies. Back to square one — just enough for domestic demand and almost nothing for export unless we import.

Nigeria. Confirmed short, argued between 20% and 30%. Prices at origin rising slowly as the picture fills in. Cargo reaches China from November–December, but not in size.

Brazil. Confirmed short. Stocks no higher than 50,000 t. The carry question is closed.

Tanzania and Mozambique. About 90% shipped, nothing offered below $1,300, and at most 10k left to move after September.

Sudan and Ethiopia. Both expected smaller, at best flat. Premium grades priced above $1,400 and not available for shipment until late October or November.

Korea. 20,000 t awarded on 9 September. Pakistan took 63%, India none.

Türkiye. Hulling throughput rising and tahina demand strong on the back of the Middle East crisis, against very low stocks. A continuous buyer through to Ramadan, competing directly with China for West African seed. Word of mouth from the trade.

Freight. Now the largest variable in landed cost. Asia to West Asia has gone from $1,200–1,800 to $3,500–4,500 a box with war-risk surcharges; Indian rates to Europe and the US are at their highest since the Red Sea disruption began.

Pakistan overland. Volumes into Iran and Iraq rising at fair prices, as ocean freight prices Indian and African seed out of that demand. Word of mouth from the trade.

Somalia. No stock left to sell cheap, and Djibouti freight westward is as high as anyone's. Also out of Japan's chain this year.

Korea's third tender

OriginTonnesShareWeighted CFR
Pakistan12,60063%$1,515
Mozambique2,00010%$1,510
Burkina Faso1,6008%$1,512
Tanzania1,2006%$1,518
Niger1,0005%$1,508
Nigeria1,0005%$1,515
China6003%$1,520
India———
Total20,000100%$1,515

Every origin cleared within a twelve-dollar band. Korea buys a specification, not a country.

The gap between these levels and what the same origins fetch elsewhere is sortex grade, palletising and the rest of the work that goes into meeting the spec. That is the useful signal: the market will pay for the specification it needs, and the money sits in the preparation rather than in the origin.

Two other readings. The November-arrival lot priced above the October one, so nobody is discounting the forward position. And Pakistan taking nearly two-thirds tells you where the good-quality cargo is being held back to — which is cargo that will not be offered cheap to China.

Nigeria is no longer a residual supplier

Nigeria now runs six or seven hulling factories that need hulling-quality seed through the year to keep running. It also carries a continuous commitment into Japan, which does not switch origins easily and has lost Somalia from its chain this season.

So the crop is spoken for before China sees it. Hulling factories first, then Japan, then Türkiye buying into Ramadan. What reaches China is the crushing-grade residual, arriving from November or December in modest volume, out of a crop already down 20–30%, with origin prices firming as the picture clears. The chance of Nigeria panicking and selling cheap is low.

Most models still treat Nigerian supply as one pool. It is now two, and only one of them is available.

India: the brakes are off

Sowing was very good, and erratic rain and weather anomalies have badly damaged it. What looked like a surplus with cargo to spare for export is back to square one: enough for domestic demand and almost nothing to ship unless we import. What makes this year different is not the damage but the absence of anything that would normally slow a rise.

Carry-over is well below last year. Bengal Double Skin, which usually caps domestic hulled when it runs, is itself priced high on a short crop. Imports are small and what is arriving is priced above domestic seed, so there is no discounted material to pull the market down.

The market is currently trying to correct toward African and Pakistani offers, but nothing underneath it is cheap, so the room for that correction is limited. Indian domestic hulled is the market most likely to move quickly from here.

Competitiveness depends on destination. India is broadly level with Nigeria on FOB, but Nigeria to Europe does not touch the Red Sea or the Cape and India does, at the highest rates in two years. Into Asia the geography reverses in India's favour. Against Pakistan, India is higher on FOB but has far wider reach and market penetration, and with Pakistan earning fair prices on border trade and holding limited hulling capacity, that gap should narrow rather than widen.

The balance as it stands

OriginLast yearNowPosition
Tanzania225k150k~90% shipped
Mozambique100–110k50–60k~90% shipped, little left after September
Brazil~500k220–250kStocks no more than 50k; carry question closed
Pakistan300kbelow 275k140–150k done; sold out by November or December
India~255kdomestic needs onlyBadly damaged; nothing for export without imports
Nigeria bloc~285kshort by 20–30%Hulling and Japan take it first; China sees the residual
Sudan~289ksmaller, at best flatPremium grades from late October
Ethiopia210ksmaller, at best flatPremium grades from late October
Chad, Burkina, Mali, Togo~270kunharvestedToo early to call; not expected below Nigeria

The handover. Pakistan has shipped or committed 140–150k of a crop now below 275k. The balance is gross, and Korean tenders and border trade keep drawing on it; at 40–50k a month it is finished by November or December. Brazil is sold out by then too. Nigerian cargo starts reaching China in November and December but not in volume, and the bulk of the West African refill has historically landed between February and April. China's crushing-grade stock is around fourteen weeks of crush if arrivals stopped.

So there is a stretch from November through to the West African refill with nothing large arriving from anywhere — and Chinese New Year and Ramadan both fall in early February, inside it.

The ledger

Bullish

  • Brazil confirmed short with stocks no higher than 50,000 t, against demand from India, Türkiye, Egypt and China at once
  • Pakistan below 275k and half sold, finishing by November or December at the current pace
  • Nigeria short by 20–30%, with hulling factories and Japan taking the quality before China bids, and origin prices firming
  • India back to domestic-only supply, with nothing to brake a rise — low carry-over, Bengal Double Skin priced high, imports above domestic
  • Every tonne of Chinese port stock is below replacement cost, so none of it comes out cheap
  • East African whitish effectively sold; what remains sits in Chinese ports rather than at origin
  • Sudanese and Ethiopian premium grades above $1,400 and not shipping until late October at the earliest
  • Türkiye buying continuously into Ramadan on low stocks; Somalia gone from the discount bid
  • Freight blocks distant substitution, so regional shortages no longer arbitrage away

Bearish

  • 381,500 tonnes in Chinese ports, enough to absorb an origin failure in the short term
  • Stock is still being added to, and Chinese buying of the cheap end is steady rather than urgent
  • Chinese imports flat in volume at a 19% lower price, with the full year forecast below last year
  • Pakistan's balance clears through the fourth quarter without anyone panicking
  • European volume flat with no growth impulse, and Middle East demand held back by freight
  • Zero-tariff access keeps the cheapest African supply flowing into China whatever the price
  • High prices cure themselves — at sustained levels farmers replant, and short-duration varieties exist in Pakistan and India

If this, then this

Brazil's shortfall sets the tone — 40%. Trigger: Brazilian stocks confirm at or below 50,000 t while India, Türkiye, Egypt and China are all in the market for the same tonnage. The origin that flooded the market two seasons ago becomes the one everybody is short of. Indian hullers, Turkish processors and Egyptian tahini plants compete with Chinese crushers for a supply that no longer exists in size, and the competition pulls the whole complex up. Crushing grade rises because its cheapest substitute has gone; whitish holds its premium because there is nothing to replace it either.

Orderly handover — 25%. Trigger: Pakistan's balance clears without haste into December, Nigerian cargo arrives from November in better volume than expected, and Chinese crushers keep blending old stock. The market stays balanced through the winter. The cheapest origins run out and values drift up, but nobody is forced to chase, and the port stock does its job as a buffer.

The northern crop disappoints — 20%. Trigger: West African, Sudanese or Ethiopian arrivals run materially below expectation from December, and world exportable supply falls below trade requirement. A benchmark reset rather than a rally, of the kind this market produces every five to seven years. Chinese stock is drawn down rather than merely held, and the buffer stops working as an idea. Freight amplifies the move, because there is no cheap distant substitute to bring in.

Demand blinks — 15%. Trigger: Chinese imports land well below last year with crush margins negative, and European and Middle Eastern offtake falls again. The only path on which the short crop does not matter. Crushing grade slips back toward last year's lows. Whitish barely moves, because there is still very little of it to sell.

Two things hold on every path. Whitish keeps a wider premium over crushing grade than its usual relationship, because the supply is simply not there. And hulled has to move further than raw in percentage terms to stay viable — a yield loss of a fifth means every rise in raw costs the huller more than it costs the trader. In a rising market the value-added end takes the squeeze first, and hulling capacity, not seed, becomes the constraint.

Freight has made distance a pricing factor again. The same seed now clears at different levels in Qingdao, Busan, Mersin, Alexandria and Rotterdam, and those gaps no longer close on the old timescale. That is why Pakistani seed moves overland into Iran and Iraq, why Egypt takes Sudanese cargo across the border, and why Nigeria is gaining in Europe at India's expense.

I hope the reports help you take the right decisions in the coming months and if you have and requirements or need for any further information , I am just a phone call or a WA message away.


Tuesday, July 28, 2026

Sesame Seed Market Report — July 2026

The Slot, and the Stockholder


Hello Everyone, once again.

It's been a while since I sat down to write one of these properly. Life and this trade have a way of keeping you busy. But a few things have been building in the sesame market over the last months that I've been wanting to put down on paper—mostly to organize my own thinking. So, here it is.

As always, these are just my readings: from the field, from conversations with friends across the trade, and this time, also from a fair bit of data that landed in my lap. Take it for what it's worth, and let's discuss.

Let me start with something I've been chewing on for a while. I was speaking in Istanbul last year, and after my talk, a Brazilian producer asked me a simple question: Now that China has opened up to Brazil, would India still buy Brazilian sesame and could China buy it all?

My answer, I think, surprised him. I said it doesn't really matter how much Brazil can produce. What matters is which slot in China's chain the Brazilian seed fits into and same for India.

The Slot

I've come to think of China not as one market, but as six or seven markets wearing one coat. They import somewhere around 1.2 million tonnes in a normal year (last year wasn't normal, but we'll come to that), and each slice of that has its own quality need, its own price tolerance, its own favorite origin.

We all know the varieties better than I could ever explain them here, but the thing I keep coming back to is how neatly they sort by destination. China takes white natural and crushing for its mills and black for its own trade; Europe, the US, and Australia take the hulled and sortex; and we in India buy raw white for our machines and sell on the finished product. Each of those is really its own distinct market.

The point I made in Istanbul was really about the ceiling on each slot. My sense, after all these years, is that if an origin's slot in China is 300,000 tonnes, dropping your price won't make China take 500,000. The usage is what it is, the blends are set, the downstream contracts are already written. I think this is why our own exports from India have hovered in that 200,000–250,000 tonne band year after year, even when the crop was much bigger. We filled the slot. The slot didn't grow just because our crop did.

Now, plenty of people in our trade see it differently, and they've told so in our groups: 

China buys on price, not loyalty, and every buyer has a replacement.

I don't disagree. Price does decide who fills a slot. Where I land slightly differently is that price doesn't seem to decide how big the slot is. In a normal year, one origin slips and another quietly takes its place, and nobody blinks. It's when everyone is short together—which is more or less where we are now—that there's no one left to step in.

There's one more thing sitting quietly under all of this. Most of Africa has always enjoyed duty-free access, and Pakistan secured preferential treatment a few years ago, which predictably drove their volumes up. The simple, underlying point is that Brazil and India carry a significant tariff disadvantage into China compared to the other major exporting countries. It feels like a quiet handicap on those two lanes that has nothing to do with how good the crop is.

Brazil is running into all of this now. Which is really the news of the season.

Brazil — I Asked Them Directly

Rather than add to the guessing, I got on a call with a few Brazilian exporters and simply asked them how it looks on the ground.

What I heard was sobering. The new crop is coming in around 200,000–220,000 tonnes. Against last year, that's close to a 60% fall. One of them said it was shocking even to them.

And it isn't the usual "area is down" story, which is what makes it worth writing about. The area did fall—growers moved to corn and to black matpe after last winter's price crash made sesame look unattractive at sowing. But the ground they gave up was the good ground, the fertile fields with the better rain. Sesame got pushed to the poorer plots and the late window. Then the rains ran late through the soybean harvest and cut off early (as they usually do around the 20th of April), so the late crop got barely forty days of water. Yield came off from about 550 kilos a hectare to around 350. Less area, and less on the area that remained—the two piling on top of each other. That's how you get to minus sixty.

A few other things they told me have stayed with me more than the headline number:

  • The carryover is basically gone. Maybe 20,000 tonnes, which is nothing. Whatever the new crop is, that's what the world gets; there's no old stock hiding behind it.

  • They're holding back. Where Brazil shipped 109,000 tonnes in a single month last September, this year they're offering little and waiting to see if their own farmers can even fill the contracts they signed. The sense I got was a trickle over four or five months rather than the flood of last year.

  • Domestic processing is growing. Three new hulling factories have come up inside Brazil. For the first time, a real slice of the crop will be processed at home instead of shipped raw. For those of us who hull for a living, that's the line I'd underline: Brazil is starting to climb the value chain. Slowly, but it's begun.

One detail explains why Brazilian white walked into China's slot so easily: the cargo is almost always machine-cleaned, purity up near 99.90%. African white is machine-cleaned too, but not always, and often carries a couple of percent of impurity and light seed. So I don't think Brazil won only on price. It won because the seed fit the slot cleanly. Worth remembering when someone calls it pure dumping.

And on the slot argument, they confirmed it without my asking. The big advance commitments went to China; but India, they said, is now paying better than China on spot. Which I read simply: China locked its slot early on forward contracts, and India, arriving late, is bidding up what's left. Price choosing who fills the slot, not making it bigger.

The Rest of the World Looks Thin Too

The wider supply picture is about as tight as I can remember, and India is where I'd start, because I think it's widely misread.

On paper, the government sowing looks alarming, but I've stopped reading it straight. Take a look at this last year IOPEPC data compilation comparing government estimates against remote sensing:

Acreage, Yield & Production Estimates

StatesGovt. Acreage 2024 (Ha)Govt. Acreage 2025 (Ha)Remote Sensing Acreage 2024 (Ha)Remote Sensing Acreage 2025 (Ha)Yield 2025 (kg/Ha)Production 2024 (Tonnes)Production 2025 (Tonnes)
Uttar Pradesh3,53,3284,39,0112,91,8241,97,8578541,91417,806
Madhya Pradesh3,28,8002,27,2002,59,6281,06,0327435,7237,893
Rajasthan2,09,8041,92,8081,94,8051,21,26011841,99914,435
Gujarat49,40040,10047,84732,1992099,3407,902
Sub Total9,41,3328,99,1197,94,1034,57,3481,28,97648,035
Other States1,97,9681,51,88165,46443,93115,5024,614
Country Total1,139,3001,051,0008,59,5675,01,2791051,44,47852,649

For your understanding, the national yield of 105 kg/ha recorded here was calculated simply by dividing the total estimated crop by the total area. This means a massive chunk of acreage that got completely washed away is still sitting in that denominator, dragging the math down to an absurdly low average.

This year, assuming the total area remains the same or maybe a little more due to El Niño, and assuming a return to somewhat normal yields, we will at max get around 150,000–160,000 tonnes even if we double the yield and assume that most farms give an output. (Though, of course, that is just an assumption for now).

But the crop isn't really the story this year. The difference from last year is what's around it. Last year, India had a huge import influx from Brazil and Nigeria. That isn't happening this year. The summer crop was revised by IOPEPC to about 125,000 tonnes, arrivals have slowed, and yes, there's stock, but a lot of it has already gone into holding.

Here's the piece I think matters most and gets overlooked. For the last three or four years, there was a reliable release valve on hulled prices. Every time hulled crossed a certain level—usually into the October–December domestic peak—two cheap things landed at once: imports arriving in volume, and the Bengal double-skin natural (the crushing material) coming in cheap. The moment hulled ran up, people simply switched to Bengal double skin for hulling and pulled the price back down.

This year, I don't see that valve. The Bengal crop is barely 80,000–90,000 tonnes and it's expensive. It won't do its usual job of capping the hulling market. And the flood of cheap imports that used to break the rallies isn't lined up either.

So when we come into October with our domestic demand, we'll have a trickle of summer-crop stock plus whatever the new crop gives us. Harvest is running late this year because the monsoon came late, so I don't see real pressure before mid-to-late October. That's where it gets interesting. Early October on, if the material simply isn't showing up, people start to get a little nervous, and that's usually where the game is played.

One honest caveat on our own competitiveness: right now, India isn't competitive globally because freights are very high. But freights are the only thing holding it—on the seed itself, we're still very competitive. The bulk market just isn't here yet. Korea isn't aggressive, Europe is quiet, and the Middle East is running mostly back-to-back because of the war.

But that demand doesn't disappear; it defers. Ramadan falls early next year, around the 8th of February. Goods have to be in position by early January—colliding with our own peak demand and a thin supply side. Ramadan demand is mostly hulled, and that's India, Pakistan, or Africa. A lot of things arriving at the exact same window.

  • Pakistan: The trade talk and the Chinese buyers put acreage down 15–20%, yet the official Punjab numbers I've seen have the province more or less flat. Both can't be fully right. My hunch is the mood is more bearish than the acreage. What isn't in doubt is the carryover—it is significantly low compared to a few months ago.

  • Africa: Thin too. Sudan well down and only a fraction leaving for export. West Africa had people puzzled back in February—peak arrival season and the cargo had simply vanished. Tanzania and Mozambique both short of last year. Carry overs nothing significant in either too. Nigeria/Togo/Burkina/Mali and even Somalia , not one origin is stated to say they are sitting on any significant stock.

Put it together, and there's no comfortable cushion anywhere. In a picture like that, the old rule I keep coming back to holds: 

One origin short is worth maybe 10% on price; more than one at once, call it 25%.

The Part I Keep Turning Over

Here's what I can't stop thinking about: 

If every origin is empty, why is the biggest buyer sitting on more stock than it has ever held?

I've had three years of weekly Qingdao port numbers to look at, and what they show is genuinely striking. Around 132,000 tonnes at the 2023 peak, 229,000 in 2024, 315,000 in 2025, and this June nearly 421,000—the highest I've ever seen it. Then it fell back toward 370,000 within a week or so. (That swing, by the way, is why I've never fully trusted any single port figure. I read it as a range and a direction, not a fixed point.)

The mix has flipped too. Three years ago, Pakistani and East African seed filled the port; today it's mostly West African white, with Pakistan and Brazil already drawing down. And the origins doing the filling are, largely, Mozambique and Tanzania .

So why does China hold so much? For as long as I've been in this trade, carryover lived at the origin. India held a buffer, Sudan held a buffer. When China imported 800,000–900,000 tonnes a year, they held maybe 180,000–200,000 at port and no more. That's changed. Last year China imported a record 1.46 million against consumption of maybe 1.2. That surplus didn't disappear. It's the pile at Qingdao.

The thought I keep landing on is that China has quietly become the carryover holder for the whole world. The buffer that used to sit at origin now sits at destination, financed cheap. When I look at that 400,000-tonne number, I'm not sure I'm looking at hungry demand—I think I might be looking at the world's carryover, just moved to one place.

But here is where the suspense really sets in for this storyline: What if the replacement supplies this year to China simply do not add up to their baseline consumption, and that port stock starts depleting? What really happens when China's port stock falls below 300,000 tonnes and continues a downward spiral, with no origin sitting on huge, sudden supplies ready to replenish that pile? Does panic set in with high-price buying, or does China sit back and stubbornly let its ultimate stock advantage wither away? It adds a layer of genuine suspense to how this season will play out.

Where I Think Prices Sit

We're at or near the median level that's held for the better part of two decades—the kind of level where, in my experience, this market has usually found its floor and turned. Those of you who've read these reports over the years know how much weight I put on these benchmarks; they've rarely let me down.

The base has already lifted, but I think the upside is capped, and the cap is that port stock. While 400,000 tonnes sits at Qingdao, sharp China-led rallies keep getting sold into. The most experienced Chinese voice I heard put the 2026 average at $1,200–$1,400 even with production cuts, because the stock is a shock absorber: below $1,000 China's appetite turns near-bottomless; above $1,400 the stock comes out to cap it. That feels about right to me as a band.

The real triggers from here are narrow: a genuine shortfall in Tanzania or Mozambique, the Indian winter crop running into weather, more Brazilian yield stress or a shocker from Pakistan, or the day China decides to rebuild rather than run its port stock down.

But if I step back from the individual pieces, here's where I land. I don't think we're oversupplied this year. The mechanisms that used to pull this market down just aren't lined up. Put that next to a thin supply side almost everywhere, a late Indian harvest, and the Ramadan and domestic peaks colliding around the turn of the year, and it feels less like a comfortable market than a quiet one waiting on a cue. The current lull could hold, or it could flip the other way fairly quickly once people realize the material simply isn't showing up.

Looking at the supply side we've walked through here, I don't think this is a market that's short of seed so much as one that's short of clarity on who needs it, and when. So that's the game I'd play.

That's all from me for now. As always, these are just one man's readings—from the field, from good friends across the trade, and this time from the data too. I've been wrong before and said so, and I may be wrong again—though I've been right more often than not, and the old blog is all still there to confirm or counter that. Weigh it against your own view, and let's keep talking.

Stay well, and good luck with your covers.

— Mukul Gupta